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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH
BUDGET SYSTEM, INC.,
~
Plaintiff arnd Respondent
vs.

Case
No. 9224

BUDGET LOAN AND FINANCE
'
PLAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court,
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, District Judge

BRIEF O·F

RESPO·NDENT

'l~HE

INTRODUCTION
This is an action by respondent to enjoin appellant
from using the word ''Budget'' in its finance business in
the Salt Lake City area. The trial court granted the
injunction. Damages were waived by respondent.
Appellant in its brief raises four points wherein it is
argued that the trial court erred. All four points attack
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Findings of Fact 11 and 12. R. 187) Their position
is that the court erred in making these Findings, and the
position of respondent is that both such Findings are
supported by competent evidence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Hugh Barker and wife commenced a small loan
business in Salt Lake County in 1928 under the name
and style of ''Budget System'' and operated such business continuously as individuals or as a corporation. In
early 1957 they incorporated the present respondent as
''Budget System, Inc.'' Shortly thereafter they entered
into an option agreement with American Co-Op Finance
Company for the purchase of all the stock of Budget
System, Inc. American Co-Op exercised the option in
the summer of 1957, and has operated this corporation
continuously since that time.
The holding company of appellant formed a corporation called ''Budget Loan and Finance Company'' in
1948. They operated under this name for a short time
in 1949, after which no business was done with the public in the name of Budget Loan and Finance until the
latter part of 1958, at which time a. finance business being
operated in the name of "Credit Finance" changed its
name to ''Budget Loan and Finance Plan'' and actively
solicited business in that name.
After the name change referred to above, large neon
signs were erected on the premises of appellant located on
the southwest corner of State Street and 8th South Street,

2
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one-half block to the north of respondent's offices. The
change in name, signs and other advertising caused the
trouble complained of by respondent, the nature of which
'vill be set out in more detail in the argument herein.
Personnel representing appellant discussed purehasing the name ''Budget System'' with the Barkers
and officers of Budget System for ten or eleven years
prior to the time of trial. The first such offer was made by
lVIr. Charles Offer, president of Budget Finance Plan, in
1948. (R. 42-43) After negotiations had started with
American Co-Op for the purchase of Budget System stock,
Mr. Gibbs, resident manager of appellant, inquired as to
the possibility of purchasing the name ''Budget Systern''
for $10,000.00. (R. 43-44) After the stock purchase, 1\fr.
Gibbs discussed such a purchase with Mr. Seegmiller.
(R. 96) Such discussions were continued after the action
was filed. (R. 97) The fact such discussions took place is
confirmed by Mr. Gibbs. (R. 136)
In negotiations with Mr. Barker for the purchase of
Budget System stock, officers of respondent were told by
Mr. Barker that he had recently had an offer to purchase
the name ''Budget System'' from appellant for $10,000.00.
Because of this offer, there was inserted in the option to
purchase the stock of Budget System, Inc., a provision
that Mr. Barker would retain an option to repurchase the
name ''Budget System'' or ''Budget System, Inc.,'' for
the sum of $6,000.00 prior to August 27, 1957. (Ex. P-1)
There was an oral understanding in connection with this
option granted Mr. Barker that if he made such a sale of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the name to appellant for a sum in excess of $6,000.00,
then such excess would be divided equally between Mr.
Barker and the purchasers of the stock of Budget System. ( R. 49-50)
In the sale of the stock of Budget System by Barker,
the name ''Budget System'' was assigned a Yalue of
$6,000.00 and the seller warranted that he was the lawful
owner of the name ''Budget System'' and the good will
related thereto, and had the exclusive right to its use in
the State of Utah. (Ex. P-1)
The important evidence on this subject is contained
in a letter from J. S. Monosson, house counsel for Budget
Finance Plan (the holding company of appellant) written December 5, 1957, to persons who purchased the
Budget System, Inc., stock. In this letter counsel recites
the fact that it was his understanding that there had been
a sale of the office of Budget System in Salt Lake City,
Utah. I-Ie states that his organization has tV\ 0 subsidiary
corporations doing a finance business in Salt Lake City
under the name of Credit Finance Plan, and continues by
saying that his organization has not been able to utilize
the name used by other offices in his chain, i. e., Budget
Finance Plan, Budget Loan and Finance, by reason of
the fact that the name ''Budget System'' 'Yas preempted
by Mr. Barker in Salt Lake City, Utah. He then goes on
to ask consent to the use of the name ''Budget Finance
Plan" in Utah. (Ex. P-11)
7

During 1949 when Budget Finance and Loan started
business at 802 South State Street in that name, consid4
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erable confusion resulted. Mr. Barker characterizes thib
confusion in the following language :
''When they first came in it nearly drove us nuts
on telephone calls and that sort of disturbance ...
"\Ve had a lot of misdirected mail.'' ( R. 37)
This confusion resulted in his threatening suit and
making complaints to the banking department, so appellant's representatives desisted from the use of the na1ne
"Budget" in their finance business. (R. 38)
Confusion by reason of the similarity of the two
names commenced in January and February, 1959, as testified to by Mrs. Nichols (R. 79), Mr. Smith (R. 64-67).
Both Mr. Gibbs and Mr. Seegmiller, managers of the
respective finance companies, testified that the confusion
increased as soon as the signs were erected on the offices
of appellant. (R. 90, 129)
Prior to trial, the outstandings of respondent were
over $100,000.00. A stock registration had been approved
for the public sale of stock of American Co-Op Finance
at the time of trial, and it was reliably anticipated that
more than $250,000.00 would be available from this stock
issue and bank credit for use in respondent's business in
the year 1960. To put this money out in loans would require advertising. Advertising and credit policies of
respondent had been interfered with because advertising
money spent by respondent under existing conditions
would help appellant more than respondent because of the
former's corner location. (R. 109) (Ex. P-16)
None of the foregoing facts are disputed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I.

FINDINGS OF FACT 11 AND 12 ARE SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND
BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

FINDINGS OF FACT 11 AND 12 ARE SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND
BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
There is no dispute with regard to any of the Findings of Fact made and entered by the trial court except
Findings of Fact number 11 and number 12. They
provide:
'' 11. That the use of the word 'Budget' in the
name of defendant since November 1958 has
caused and will continue to cause confusion and
deception to the public in the Salt Lake City area
among present and potential customers therein.
That the similarity of said names is a deceptive
use by defendant, an unfair trade practice, and has
and will result in probable damage to plaintiff's
business.

'' 12. That the use of said name has \Yorked to
the injury of plaintiff in an undeterminable amount
and if continued will result in further and increased prejudice to plaintiff's business. That
plaintiff herein waives the allowance of pecuniary
damage herein. ''
Appellant contends: (a) that the use of the two names
and businesses located as they are resulted in no con6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fusion, and (b) that the word ''Budget'' is a generic term
and, therefore, not entitled to be protected by one organization as against its use by another organization engag·ed
in similar activities.
Respondent's position is, briefly, that they proved by
a preponderance of the evidence two facts which entitled
them to the relief granted by the trial court. These facts
are:
(a) That shortly after the use by appellant of
the word ''Budget'' in its name confusion developed
and would continue to exist by reason of such use of
the word "Budget."
(b) That the word "Budget" when used in the
name of competing businesses is of a class which
entitled the first user to its exclusive use.
The evidence supporting the two facts mentioned
above will now be presented separately.
(a)

THAT SHORTLY AFTER THE USE BY APPELLANT OF THE WORD "BUDGET" IN
ITS NAME CONFUSION DEVELOPED AND
WOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST BY REASON
OF SUCH USE OF THE WORD "BUDGET".

A log was kept of the misdirected calls received at the
office of respondent. (Exhibit P-8) This log, when considered with the testimony of Mrs. Nichols, stands uncontradicted and is that there were 108 instances of misdirected
calls and customers during the 22 working days of July,
1959. This office girl also testified that in each case of
misdirection it became necessary to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1. Check their Cardex system.
2. Check their loan pockets.
3. Check Mr. Barker's old accounts.
4. Render a lengthy explanation involving the

miXup.
5. Return payments, etc., to appellant by mail and
personal delivery. (R. 79)
Mr. Smith, the manager in the early part of 1959,
testified that there were a lot of misdirected phone calls,
mail payments and customers. (R. 64) Also that one misdirected phone call required he or his assistant to examine the complete filing system, current, past, and back into
Barker's records. (R. 64)
Mr. Gibbs, the manager of appellant, admits this
existing confusion by testifying as follows:
'' Q. Has there been in your experience any con-

fusion between your organization and Budget
System since you started doing business the
latter part of 1958 in the name of 'Budget
I_Joan and Finance'~
''A. Well, there is no confusion other than the
routine things that we haYe mentioned up
until the time \Ye put up the signs as I stated
in my deposition.
'' Q. And did confusion develop

then~

"A. Yes, it did." (R. 129)
'' Q. As you said before, any confusion that has re-

sulted in the office of the Budget System or in
your office you feel is because of the use of
the two names 'Budget' in both institutions'
names~

8
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".L\. That and their location." (R. 130)

The latter quotation was made during the taking of
Mr. Gibbs' deposition.
Mr. Seegmiller outlined the procedures used by the
various finance companies before making loans to prospective customers. (R. 88) In the loan applications the
prospective borrower is required to indicate any finance
company that has made such borrower loans in the past,
and also any finance companies to which he was presently
in debt. The finance company then investigated directly
by telephone with each finance company appearing in the
application and in so doing they used the membership of
the Lender's Exchange. (Ex. P-14) On Exhibit P-14 respondent company is nearer the top of this schedule of
local finance companies than is appellant which would
account for large numbers of misdirected telephone calls.
This would be expected to be increased with the expansion of the business of both institutions.
The colored photos, Exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5 and P-6,
show the illuminated signs on both sides of appellant's
building and indicate the extent that the word "Budget"
is emphasized as compared with the other V\ 0rds in the
full title of appellant.
7

Exhibit D-9 indicates the same facts with regard to
respondent.
Confusion of any and all types is to be expected by
reason of these similar activities emphasizing the same
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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word in their titles operating a mere 100 yards from each
other.
(b)

THAT TI-IE WORD "BUDGET" WHEN USED
IN THE NAME OF COMPETING BUSINESSES IS OF A CLASS WHICII El~TITLED THE
FIRST USER TO ITS EXCLUSIVE USE.

The thinking of appellant's officers with regard to the
significance of the word ''Budget'' seems to have changed
quite suddenly. For nearly ten years prior to the trial
of this action, negotiations had been off and on with
regard to the purchase of respondent's name for a substantial amount of money. (R. 43-44, 39, 48-50, 96, 97, 114,
136, Ex. P-1, P-2, P-11) This kind of talk was still being
maintained after the suit was filed. (R. 97) Finally,
appellant's legal counsel, as late as December 5, 1957,
quite candidly admits that those in control of appellant's
organization have been unable to utilize the name used by
other offices in their chain by reason of the fact that the
name "Budget System" was preempted by Mr. Barker in
Salt Lake City. (Ex. P-11) "Budget" is the only common word in the name of respondent and in the name of
appellant's organization. This attorney is conversant
with the meaning of words. The word ''preempted'' is defined by Webster as ''a taking beforehand to the exclusi~n of others.'' This admission of the general counsel for
appellant coincides with the decision reached by the trial
court and should conclude this matter.
The evidence conclusively indicates that appellant's
representative were of the opinion that the name was of
such a character as to be subject to protection. Respond10
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ent 's testimony presented by Mr. Barker indicates that
this name was protected for 32 years in the Salt Lake area
successfully and at the time he sold, it was worth a substantial sum of money for which he was paid. (R. 39)
Respondent, as early as 1949, was successfully stopped by
Mr. Barker from using the word "Budget" in its name.
(R. 38) To all intents and purposes representatives of
appellant found that they could not successfully use the
word "Budget" while Mr. Barker was connected with
Budget System, but after he parted with it, concluded that
they could get away with it while it was under the control
of respondent.
The cases, and particularly those decided more recently, fully support the result reached by the trial court.
The most significant and carefully considered decision is
contained in an opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court in
the case of Cazierv. Economy Cash Stores, Inc., 228 P. 2d
436 (1951). The two names involved in this action were
''Economy Grocery'' and ''Economy Cash Stores, Inc.,''
located in Burley, Idaho. The action was brought to restrain defendant from doing business under its trade
name on the ground of confusing similarity to that of
plaintiff. The trial court enjoined defendant from so
doing but the injunction was held to be too broad and the
Supreme Court of Idaho enjoined defendant from using
the word ''Economy'' in its name. The writer has found.
no case where more similarity of words involved could
be found than ''Economy'' and ''Budget.'' There were
not as many misdirected matters in the Economy case as
in the case at bar. Plaintiff had been doing business for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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more than 18 years prior to the action. The evidence
showed that after defendant had commenced using the
name, plaintiff experienced some difficulty in receiving
merchandise which was misdirected between the two. Each
party received letters which were intended for the other
and advertising was confusing. Many people thought
plaintiff owned both stores and payments were misdirected. Defendant presented six assignments of error
which were substantially the same as those presented by
appellant here. These were :
(1) The fai1ure of the Court to find that business of plaintiff suffered by defendant's use of its
name.

(2) Failure to find that the public would be
imposed upon.
(3) Failure to find that defendant had attempted or was attempting to palm off its goods.
( 4) Failure to find that the trade name of
plaintiff had acquired a secondar~T meaning.
( 5) Failure to find that defendant 'vas engaged in unfair competition.
( 6) That a finding of confusion alone is not
sufficient to support a judgment for injunctive
relief.
Each of the six objections made by defendant in this
. Idaho case was made by appellant in the trial court or in
this court. The Idaho court laid down the following rules
of law with regard to each:
( 1) That in this type of case it is not necessary to
support an injunction to show that the first trader suf-

12
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fcred damage. It cites Bernstein v. Friedman, 160 P.
2d 227, wherein the Wyoming Supreme Court states:
''The cases seem to be clear that it is not necessary to show actual damages in cases like that
before us.''
The Court adopts the language in La;nahan. v. John
Kissell & Son, CCA, 135 F. 899 at 903.
"It must be apparent that in a case such as
before us, it would be ordinarily difficult to prove
actual damages, and a plaintiff would be substantially remediless, if he could not be protected by
an injunction except where actual damages in dollars and cents were sho,vn.''
Other authority is also cited.
(2) ''It is not necessary to show that the public would
be imposed upon.'' Numerous cases cited.
(3) It is not necessary that plaintiff prove that defendant was attempting to palm off its goods as those of
plaintiff.
''Where there is no showing in the record of
palming off, its absence does not undermine the
finding of unfair competition. Champion Spark
Plug Company v. Sanders, 331 U. S. 125, 67 S. Ct.
1136, 91 L. Ed. 1386.''
( 4) Plaintiff by long use had acquired a secondary
meaning of a trade name.
"What constitutes secondary meaning of a
trade name is a question of fact. 52 Am. Jur. 557,
Sec. 77; 150 A. L. R. 1082. The court did find
that respondent had used his trade name in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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13

particular area since the month of September,
1930, and that the appellant had used its corporate name in the same trade area since June 5,
1948. Where a p-arty uses a trade name for a long
time it is evidence, though not conclusive, of the
secondary mean.ing of the term. Bernstein v. Friedman, supra; see also 150 A. L. R. 1087, at page
1089. The court, by implication, at least, made a
finding that the respondent's trade name had
acquired a secondary meaning. National Shoe Corporation v. National Shoe 1\ifg. Co., Inc., supra."

''Evidence of actual confusion and deception
on the pa,rt of customers is not readily available,
often difficult to sec-u.re and is not always necessary where the similarity of names in itself s~tg
gests confusion. Gehl v. Hebe Co., 7 Cir., 276,
F. 271."
(Emphasis supplied)
(5-6) Confusion is a question of fact. Cases cited.
''A showing of confttsion,. present or probable,
is sufficient to justify injunctive relief where a
trade na.me has acquired a secondary meaning. In
the case of American Home Benefit Ass 'n., Inc. vs.
United American Benefit Ass'n, supra, this court
held that it is not necessary that the complainant
show specific in.sta;nces where confusion, or deception, or both, as a basis of injunctive relief; it is
sttfficient to show probable confusion or that the
use of a deceptively similar name is likely to lead
to confusion. This court in so holding cited from
63 C. J., pp. 396 and 397, as follows: '' * * * in
order to make out a case of unfair competition, it
is not necessary to sho\v that any person has been
actually deceived by defendant's conduct and led
to purchase his goods in the belief that they are the
goods of plaintiff or to deal with defendant thinking he was dealing with plaintiff; it is sufficient to

14
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show that such deception. will be the natural and
probable result of defendant's a.cts."
''The cases are very n.umerous where relief ha.s
been afforded upon the ground of unfa.ir compe·tition agaJinst a deceptive use of generic or descriptive na.mes and ma.rks, personal, geographical,
corpora.te, and other names, none of which are
ca.pable of exclusive appropriation as technical
trademarks.''

The more recent decisions hold that in a case of this
kind, i. e. involving similarity in name, actual competition between the parties involved need not be shown.
148 A.L.R. 12.
Examples where injunctions were granted are Lin·coln Motor Compan.y v. Lincoln Auto Company, 44 F. 2d

812; Investors Syndicate v. Hughes, 38 NE 2d 754, Ill. In
this case the court stated that the more modern test has
been "less emphasis on competition and more on confusion." Standard Accident Insurance Company v. Standard Surety atnd C. Company, 53 F. 2d 119, where it was

held the names were confusingly similar, therefore objectionable, even though there was no competition because
they were engaged in different lines of in.surance. The lat-

ter case is particularly significant in view of the introduction of the classified section of the telephone book where
counsel took the position that "budget" was in the same
category with "continental" and "general." It would
seem that ''standard'' more nearly conforms to these
terms than does ''budget.''
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There is an annotation in 66 A. L. R. 949 entitled
''Protection of business or trading corporation against
use of same or similar name by another corporation.''
At 66 A. L. R. 954 the rule is stated : ''It is generally
held in accordance with the rule applied in the case of
trade names that if there is sufficient similarity to deceive, it is not necessary to establish a fraudulent intent
in the use of the name.''
At 66 A. L. R. 967 the rule with relation to closely
related lines is stated to be: ''Where the companies are
engaged in lines of business which form a part of the same
general commercial field, and are so closely related that
simulation of a name by one is likely to result in injury to
the other, it has been held that the general rule does not
apply, and that __ relief will be gran-ted, even though
the comp·anies are not, strictly speaking, engaged in
competition.''
Names of cases supporting this rule are: Long's
Hat Stores Corporation v. Long's Clothes, 231 N. Y.
Supp. 107, which held that good will of the older company
might be affected because a hat business and a retail
clothing business were closely related. Bu,sh Ter1ninal

Comparny v. Bush Terminal Trucking Co1npany, 206 N.Y.
Supp. 2. These names were held to be confusing even
though the companies were in different lines of business.
At 66 A. L. R. 972 the rule as stated is "actual confusion need not be shown, but it is sufficient to show that

16
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confusion is probable or likely to occur. This rule is universally recognized.
In the following cases the names were held to be so
similar that relief was granted:

Atlas Assur(UJII;ce Comparny- Atlas Insur(}jybce Company, 112 N. W. 232; Iowa. Auto Market- Auto Market
and Exchange, 197 N. W. 321; Buick Motor Co.- Buick
Used Motors, 229 N. Y. Supp. 3; M. M. N e~ucomer Compan,y- Newcomer's New Store, 217 S. W. 822; Albany
Savings Book- Albany City Savin,gs Bank, 190 N. Y.
Supp. 334, both banks located in the same oity; International Trust Company- International Loa.n a.nd Trust
Comparn.y, 26 N. E. 693, Mass.; Lloyd Bank, LimitedLloyds In~vestment Trust Company, 28 Times L. R. 379,
England; Accident Insurance Company, Limited·- Accident, Disease, and General Insurance Corporation Limited, 54 L. J. Ch. N. S., England. The court indicated in
this case that the result would probably have been different if the word ''accident'' was not the first word in
each name; Armington & Sims Company- Armington &
Sims Engine Comp·any, 42 Atl. 308, 27 A. L. R. 1024; B.
Forman Compan~y ,_ Forman Manrufacturing Company,
Inc. Here both companies dealt in the retailing of furs and
the second companies proposed to establish its store only
a few doors distance from that of the first company, 125
N. Y. Supp. 597; Backus Oil Company- Backus Oil a;nd
Car Grease Comp·any, 8 Ohio 93; Eureka Fire Hose Comp(JIYty- Eureka Rubber Manrufacturing Compa.ny, 60 Atl.
561; Hudson Tire Company, Inc.·- Hudson Tire arnd Rubber Compa;n.y, 276 F. 59; Kansas City Real Estate and
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Stock Exchan.ge-Ka;n,s~s City Real Estate Exchan.ge, 5
S. W. 29; Lamb Kn,it Goods Company-La.mb Glove arnd
Mitten Comparny, 78 N. W.1072. Factories here were located in different towns, but the business was done mainly
through agents and there were many instances of confusion; Materialmen's M erca;ntile Associated, Limited New York Materialmen's M erca.ntile Association,. Inc.,
155 N.Y. Supp. 706. Both businesses were located in New
York and conducted by soliciting agents. The fact that .
the offices were located in different parts of the city was
held not to insure against confusion; McFell Electric Co.McFell Electric arnd Telephone Co., 110 Ill. App. 182;
lVIcVey Seed & Floral Co.- G. B. McVey & Sons Seed
Comp~a.ny, Inc., 79 So.116 ·; Pa;nsy Waist Company- Pansy
Dress Co., 196 N. Y. Supp. 825; Plarnters' Fertilizer &
Phospha.te Co.- Planters' Fertilizer Co., 133 S. E. 706;
Un~ted States Mercantile Reporting & Collecting Association - Un~ted States Mercarntile Reporting Comparny, 21
Abb. 115 N. Y.; Van Aucken Steam Specialty Co.- Van
Aucken, Company, 57 Ill. App. 240; King's Seafood- King
of the Sea, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 702; Empire Trust CompanyEmpire Financ-e Corporation, 41 S. W. 2d 847; America.n
Radio Stores, Inc.- Am,erican Radio db Television Stores
Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 127, 150 A. 180, where the court ob~
served that the words "radio" and "stores" were purely
descriptive and so not appropriable, but the addition
of the word ''American'' '""as a distinguishing mark,
in the use of which claimant was entitled to be protected; Barber & Co., Inc.- Barber Co., Inc., 277 N. Y.
55, 12 N. E. 2d 790, 115 A. L. R. 1236; Churchill Downs,
In,c. ·-Churchill Downs Distilling Co., 90 S. W. 2d 1041;
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b,conon~y

Food Products Co.- Economy Grocery Stores
Corp., 183 N. E. 49. The court held the names were
too similar, but denied relief on the ground of laches;
Home Jn,sulation Co.- Home & Building Insulation
Co., 32 P. 2d 1065, Okla.; Peerless Laundry Co.Peerless Service Lawndry, Inc., 161 Atl. 832; Personal Finance Comparny of Lincoln- Personal Loan Service, 275
N. W. 324, Nebr.; Standard Oil Co. of Calif.- Starndard Oil
Co. of New Mexico, 56 F. 2d 973, CCA lOth. The court observed that there could be no doubt that if defendant
were permitted to engage in the petroleum business, third
persons would deal with defendant thinking they were
dealing with plaintiff; Standard Oil Co. of New Y arkStandard Oil Co. of Maine, 45 F. 2d 309, CCA 1.
None of the titles in the cases cited by appellant are
particularly similar. Certainly they are not as similar as
those involved here and illustrated by the citations quoted
above. A possible exception is the case of Federal Securities Company v. Federal Securities Corporation,. 276 Pac.
1100 (Ore.). This is an old case, having been decided in
1929. The trial court found that the plaintiff's business
was practically all retail while the defendant's business
was practically all wholesale. It also appeared that when
the Commissioner observed that confusion might arise
through the similarity of defendant's name with that of
plaintiff, the defendant readily acquiesced in his suggestion that the words ''of Illinois'' be added to its name.
This addition certainly points up a distinction.
An explanation is in order as to why respondent did
not attempt to prove damages. This failure to prove
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damages is not fatal as indicated in the cases cited aboveo
The chief reason in this case for not attempting to prove
them arose from the following set of circumstances. Obviously the amount and extent of interference must be
proved from the books and records of appellant. The
records that would best illustrate this would be loan applications which resulted in approval or denial of loans,
inasmuch as these records would show whether or not loan
applicants had been previous customers of respondent.
In the answer of appellant to respondent's interrogatories
they reported that this information was not available.
Plaintiff's interrogatory No. 12 (R. 11) asked for this
information. The answer was ''None that we know of.''
(R. 24) Toward the end of the trial, however, appellant's
manager, Mr. Gibbs, indicated that this information was
available when he testified that he kept all applications
whether they resulted in loans or not from six to twelve
months. (R. 169) His reason for not presenting these
records appears to be that it would have necessitated his
going through some 1200 loan pockets besides the applications that had been turned down. (R. 170-171) Counsel for
respondent was justified in assuming that the answers to
interrogatories were correct. 1\Ir. Gibbs' testimony indicated these answers were in error during the last few
minutes of the trial.
Respondent was and is prepared to expend a large
sum of money in acquiring ne"\v licenses and advertising,
and are unwilling to do so when the result would benefit
its competitor, the appellant herein. The only other alternative, if this projected means of doing buiness is under20
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taken, is to change the name of the respondent. If this
were done, respondent would lose the good will created
by its name which was created by 28 years of service to
hundreds of customers. So, if the trial court is not sustained, future damage to respondent is a certainty.
Finally, the reason it is not necessary to prove damages in this type of action in order to prevail, is that
arriving a.t an amount that is anywhere near correct and
which is not highly speculative is practically impossible.
Appellant argues that because the Bank Commissioner of the State of Utah p.ermitted the change of name
from Credit Finance Plan to Budget Loan and Finance
Plan, that they are entitled to continue business in that
name. It asks this court to presume that a.n investigation
"\Vas made by the Commissioner. There is no evidence that
an investigation was made and the fact is that there was
not. Matters involving unfair trade practice are administered by the courts generally, and in some particular
instances by commissions set up for this sole purpose.
This type of matter is no concern of public authorities
vested with the power to issue licenses or permits. It is
universally held that the granting of a charter or certificate of incorporation or license does not entitle one
party to use a trade name to the detriment of another
using a similar name. 66 A.L.R. 1014, 115 A.L.R. 1252.
Some point is also made that Mr. Barker abandoned
the name ''Budget Finance.'' The only business he did
in this name was flooring a few cars and this particular
company had no lending license and did not have a bank
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account. (R. 56) The positive testimony of Mr. Barker is
that by filing affidavits he intended to protect the word
"Budget." (R. 57) There was no question of abandonment involved in this case. No issue was made on this subject in the pleadings or pretrial order. The positive
evidence is exactly to the contrary as evidenced by the
option to purchase the stock of Budget System, (Ex. P-1)
wherein Mr. Barker warrants the exclusive use of the
name in the State of Utah for a consideration of $6,000.
The fact of abandonment depends upon the intent of the
person involved.
CONCLUSION
Practically all the testimony submitted in behalf of
respondent had as its purpose the sustaining of Findings
of Fact numbers 11 and 12. Respondent's evidence in support of these two Findings of Fact was also supported by
the manager of appellant, and by the legal counsel of
appellant. The only real issue in this case is whether the
similarity of names has resulted in confusion or is likely
to result in confusion. The manager of appellant freely
admitted that when the signs were put on the building
confusion commenced. Counsel for appellant admitted in
writing that the use of the word ''Budget'' had been ''preempted'' by respondent's predecessor in title in the Salt
Lake area. There is no evidentiary conflict on the real
issue in this case. Appellant attempts to initiate such a
conflict by argument.
This particular case involves a factor not usually
found in this type of litigation. The evidence is uncon-
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tradicted that respondent has available a considerable
amount of money which it intends to use to expand its
business. It has been unable to do so for more than a
year because of the insistence of appellant in continuing
to use a similar name. Pecuniary injury, therefore, has
developed since the institution of this litigation, and particularly since judgment was rendered in the trial court.
Appellant has posted a bond pursuant to the order of the
court for the purpose of staying its execution and securing the payment of damages and injury pending this
appeal. (R. 191)
There being no disagreement as to the facts that warrant the conclusion of the trial court, it is respectfully
submitted that its judgment should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
· MULLINER, PRINCE & MANGUJ\!I
Attorneys for Respondent

817 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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